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Competitive political campaigns are still a very controversial issue. Disputes on this
subject relate both to the inﬂuence of campaigns on political outcomes and to their
impact on welfare.
In this paper we propose a model of political campaigns that allows us to study the
interdependence between campaign expenditures, candidates’ positions, and electoral
outcomes. Our paper unites political behavior and donor behavior. We focus on the
following often-observed political races. At the beginning of a political race for oﬃce,
two candidates try to obtain campaign support from interest groups. They announce
positions that will be perceived very inaccurately by the voters if they diﬀer from
positions announced in the past. Moreover, an incumbent may have a much clearer
position than a challenger because he has been in oﬃce for a long time. Since voters
are assumed to be risk-averse, the candidates will try to improve communication with
voters during campaigns in order to reduce location uncertainty. Fund-raising is a
necessary condition for getting messages across, so candidates will attempt to obtain
campaign contributions at the beginning of the political race to gain mobility within
the political spectrum.
We study the equilibria of this game and shed light on the role of political campaigns.
Our main results are as follows: We ﬁrst show that there is a unique equilibrium regard-
ing the platform choices of candidates if interest group donations are prohibited. The
game with interest group donations essentially brings forth two equilibria. Each candi-
date’s chance of winning the election depends on the equilibrium that is realized. The
winning candidate uniquely determined in one equilibrium normally receives contribu-
tions from a majority of donors. An important feature of our equilibria is the presence
of a certain run on donors’ contributions. A donor1 may contribute money to one
candidate in one equilibrium and support the other candidate in the other equilibrium.
As a consequence, even if candidates’ initial positions and the ideal points of interest
groups are symmetrically distributed around the median, the political platforms chosen
in equilibrium will be asymmetric.
Moreover, we demonstrate that donors may support a candidate whose position is
not very close to their own ideal point in order to draw the platform of the winning
candidate towards their own bliss points. Suppose, for example, that the rightist
candidate wins the election. Then, in our model, donors to the right of the winning
1E.g. a donor located close to the median voter.
2rightist candidate give money to the leftist candidate, as this pushes the equilibrium
platform of the rightist candidate towards the left. Donors located around the median,
however, will support the winning candidate. Constellations in which interest groups
support the candidate on the other side of the political spectrum are observed in
political races. For instance, in 1994 in Germany, industry organizations contributed a
lare amount of campaign money to the left-wing Social Democrats (see Gersbach and
Liessem (2002)).
Further, we ﬁnd that the candidates do not adopt the same median position in all
equilibria. Instead, campaigns lead to a partial convergence of platforms in comparison
with the corresponding equilibria without political advertising. Campaigns thus induce
the winning platform to move closer to the median ideal platform.
Our analysis could also enrich the incumbent/challenger discussion. A traditional argu-
ment suggests that incumbents are perceived with lower uncertainty than a challenger,
which implies a disadvantage for challengers if voters are risk-averse (see e.g. Bernhardt
and Ingberman (1985)). In our model, a risky challenger may defeat an incumbent if
he is able to organize donors approprietly, because if donors believe that the challenger
will win, a majority of donors will support him, thus conﬁrming their expectations.
Finally, we will discuss in the ﬁnal section how our results in comparison with other
theoretical results could be used to draw inferences about whether candidates for public
oﬃces are more interested in policies or in winning elections.
While we perform our analysis in the framework with risk-averse voters where cam-
paigns reduce uncertainty, it is important that the same results could be obtained by
the framework suggested by Baron (1994), where voters are either informed about in-
tentions of parties and candidates or not, and advertising is persuasive. Uninformed
voters react to campaigns and a higher amount of money enables candidates to increase
the share of voters for a given platform. Moreover, any model in which the share of
votes reacts positively to higher campaign expenditures will produce the same results
for our type of model.
The paper is organized as follows: In the next section we review the literature. In
section three we outline the model. In section 4 we analyze the eﬀects of campaigns.
In section 5 we examine the donor and political equilibria. Subsequently, we discuss
extensions of the model and propose some ﬁnal conclusions.
32 Relation to the Literature
Three types of model have been proposed for political campaigns. First, Austen-Smith
(1987) developed a model of directly informative advertising. Voters observe candi-
dates’ positions with noise, and campaign expenditures reduce the variance of that
noise. Building on this assumption, Gersbach (1998) has developed a theory of cam-
paigns in which the decision of an arbitrary number of interest groups on who they
want to support is endogenized. Second, Potters, Sloof, and van Winden (1997), Gers-
bach (2004), and Prat (2002) use non-directly informative advertising. Each candidate
is characterized by a non-policy dimension (valence) that lobbies can observe more
precisely than voters. The amount of campaign money a candidate collects signals his
valence to voters. Hence the role of campaign advertising is not to convey a direct
message but to credibly “burn” campaign money.2 New, interesting work based on
the signalling approach can be found in Coate (2004a and 2004b) and Vanberg (2008).
Third, Baron (1994), McKelvey and Ordeshook (1987), Grossman and Helpman (1996),
and Ortuno Ortin and Schultz (2005) distinguish between informed and “uninformed”
or “impressionable” voters. The informed electorate votes according to the policies
proposed by the diﬀerent political parties (or candidates). Impressionable voters are,
however, poorly informed about the policies of the diﬀerent parties, and their vote is di-
rectly inﬂuenced by campaign spending.3 This type of campaign is therefore persuasive
advertising.
We assume that the candidates can use funds to increase the share of voters supporting
them. This can be interpreted as persuasive advertising or as informative advertising,
where candidates use money to reduce (risk-averse) voters’ uncertainty about candi-
dates’ policy positions. We emphasize that any model in which the share of votes
reacts positively to higher campaign expenditures will produce the same results as in
this paper.
We allow for the fact that candidates’ ability to aﬀect voting by campaign expenditures
will diﬀer. In contrast to Gersbach (1998), who focuses on candidates with policy
2A diﬀerent way of modeling campaign expenditures is found in Austen-Smith and Wright (1994)
and Austen-Smith (1995). Here lobbies make contributions in exchange for access to politicians.
Politicians care about the information that lobbies can provide them with. The extent of truthful
information transmission increases in the preference congruence between a lobby and the politician
(see Crawford and Sobel (1982)). Campaign contributions signal preference congruence and induce
candidates to grant access to the lobbies.
3This type of campaign is similar to the persuasive advertising analyzed in economic literature, for
example Shy (1995).
4preferences, we assume that candidates maximize their votes. The results thus contrast
with Gersbach (1998). In the concluding section, we discuss how this could help to
test empirically diﬀerent theories.
One of our central results is that interest group donations move the political outcome
towards the median voter. The reason is that donors behave strategically. If a majority
of interest groups expect that a candidate will win, he obtains the majority of inter-
est group donations allowing him to move towards the center without being perceived
as overly risky. This, in turn, makes the candidate attractive for a majority of vot-
ers, which conﬁrms the assumptions of interest groups. This insight is complementary
to the work of Wittman (2007 and 2008). Wittman (2008), for instance, has high-
lighted the importance of allowing uninformed voters to have counterstrategies when
advertising is directed towards other voters. When those uninformed voters who do
not receive targeted campaign adverstising respond optimally, any negative eﬀect of
pressure groups and political advertising is mitigated and the political outcome moves
towards the median voter.
3 Political Competition without Campaigns
3.1 The basic model
Electoral processes exhibit many features, but they can be essentially broken down into
four stages, which include political advertising. The time pattern can be described as
follows:
Stage 1: Candidates attempt to obtain campaign support from politically active groups.
Donors spend their money to enhance the expected utilities arising for them from
election.
Stage 2: In the political strategy space, candidates choose positions that will remain
ﬁxed during the whole electoral contest. The positions are determined largely so
as to maximize votes after their advertising eﬀorts. The voters are only imper-
fectly aware of the initial locations of the candidates.
Stage 3: Candidates use their ﬁnancial support to convince the voters of the relative
advantage of their positions. In our context, this basically means that candidates
are engaged in reducing the uncertainty concerning their announced positions
and in improving their mobility.
5Stage 4: Individuals cast their votes, and the electoral outcome is determined by a
voting method that corresponds in our case to majority voting.
This sequential election procedure can be observed in many countries. Consider, for
example, the primary elections in the U.S., where interest groups spend money to in-
ﬂuence the choice of candidates or representatives in one party and hence the ﬁnal
party platform for the general election. Moreover, potential candidates for congres-
sional elections in the U.S. receive money and engage in fund-raising even before they
have announced their candidacy or have deﬁned a political platform.
We assume that voters view two candidates (or parties) b and c as being located
somewhere on a one-dimensional political space X with degrees of uncertainty about
precisely where they are located.4
The positions of the candidates are denoted by xb and xc. Voters perceive the an-
nouncements of platforms by candidates as a noisy signal about the policies a winning
candidate would pursue in oﬃce. Policies are perceived by voters as random variables
with a mean equal to the platform of the winning candidate. The candidates’ policies,
i.e. the positions they would pursue in oﬃce if elected, are denoted by wb and wc, and
diﬀer, from the voters’ point of view, from the initially announced platforms xb and xc
by random variables zb and zc, wb = xb + zb and wc = xc + zc with E(zb) = E(zc) = 0.
We exclude idiosyncratic voter perceptions, but allow the variance to depend on the
expected location of the candidate. We assume that there exists one location for each
candidate where they have an absolute advantage concerning the certainty of their
positions as perceived by voters. If candidates move away from their established posi-
tions, they will progressively lose the advantage based on voter perceptions. Parties, for
instance, are often perceived via some form of ideological label. If a party or candidate
changes position, the voters will have much greater diﬃculty in predicting the candi-
dates’ “true” positions. Moreover, as discussed in Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985),
candidates can lose their reputation if they leave the “initial” position determined in
the past, which, in turn, increases the uncertainty of voters regarding the true positions.
An important remark is appropriate. The model allows two diﬀerent interpretations
as to the rationality of voters. First, we can assume that voters – or a subset –
are impressionable and not fully rational in the usual sense. They could infer the
policies candidates would pursue if they knew, for instance, the pattern of campaign
contributions or the ideal points of voters. Second, we can view voters as Bayesian
4X may be a single issue space or a single composite ideological dimension.
6learners. In particular, when a candidate, say b, chooses a platform, he chooses an
a-priori distribution with mean xb and a given variance. Campaigns are sequences of
draws for a given distribution with a known mean and unknown variance. At the end
of the campaign, voters form a-posteriori beliefs (see e.g. DeGroot (1970)) and cast
their votes based on their expected utilities.
We use by V b and V c to denote the variances of the positions of the two candidates
b and c as perceived by the voters. The dependence on the eﬀective position of the
candidates is given by
V
b = fb + kb(|xb − ˆ xb|)
V
c = fc + kc(|xc − ˆ xc|) (1)
fb, fc, kb, kc > 0
xb and xc are the positions chosen by the candidates. ˆ xb and ˆ xc denote the most ﬁrmly
established position of the candidates, that is, the location they are perceived to occupy
with the lowest uncertainty. The variables fb and fc represent irreducible uncertainty,
which we will call henceforth “ﬂoor uncertainty”. kb and kc represent the mobility
costs. Thus, if a candidate diverges from his established point, he will generate greater
uncertainty, the higher values kb or kc are, respectively. Since voters are risk-averse,
this makes spatial movements costly to vote-maximizing candidates so that in fact, kb
and kc represent mobility costs.
For tractability, the single-peaked utility function of voter i is given by
ui(w) = di − (w − xi)
2 (2)
di > 0 represents the maximum utility obtainable by i, and xi his own most-preferred
point on the dimension X.
We assume that ˆ xb ≤ xb < xm = 0 < xc ≤ ˆ xc, which implies that we have a leftist and
a rightist candidate as in most two-candidate elections. xm is the ideal point of the
median voter.
Voters believe candidates to the extent that their point estimations are xb and xc.5 The
corresponding utilities for two candidates’ positions xb and xc as expected by voter i













= di − (xc − xi)
2 − V
c (3)

















We here deduce candidate equilibrium without advertising. The candidates maximize








V c − V b
2(xc − xb)
(5)




Now we deduce the Nash equilibrium of the political game. The ﬁrst-order condition





By calculation of the corresponding ﬁrst-order condition for candidate b, we obtain (see
Appendix 1)
xc =













(kc + kb) + xb (9)
8We note that the candidates choose diﬀerent positions despite the single-peakness util-
ity function of the voters. This result is caused by the fact that there is an incentive
to deviate from a common position, e.g. the median position. It is true that a spatial
movement toward more extreme positions will attract fewer voters by reason of the
distance eﬀect. But by approaching his established position a candidate reduces uncer-
tainty and gains in reputation. This will overrule the distance eﬀect if the candidates
are very close.
If the candidates quickly forfeit clarity by leaving established positions (i.e. if kc and
kb are high), the candidates will be very separately located in equilibrium. If, however,
fb = fc, ˆ xb = −ˆ xc and kc = kb, we will arrive at xc = 1
4(kb + kc) and xb = −1
4(kb + kc).
For very small values of kb, kc, we obtain the classical median voter result xb = xc = 0.
Finally we spell out the conditions under which this equilibrium holds. We have as-
sumed that ˆ xb ≤ xb and xc ≤ ˆ xc. The ﬁrst condition implies




2 ≥ 0 (10)
Similarly, we obtain the second condition:




2 ≤ 0 (11)
Next we turn to the investigation of campaigns.
4 The Eﬀects of Campaigns
4.1 The impact of campaigns
As discussed in Section 3.1, our main assumption is that campaign expenditures aﬀect
voting behavior. We can justify this assumption either by reference to informative ad-
vertising in the sense of Austen-Smith (1987), where a sequence of costly messages can
reduce the variance of policies, or by interpreting campaigns as persuasive advertising
(see Baron (1994) or Grossman and Helpman (1996)), where voters are either informed
about intentions of candidates or not. Uninformed voters react to campaigns, and a
higher amount of money enables candidates to increase the proportion of uninformed
voters for a given platform. We emphasize that any model in which the share of votes
reacts positively to higher campaign expenditures will produce the same results as in
9this paper.
4.2 Campaigns and political outcomes
To deﬁne the contributions of donors, we ﬁrst have to investigate the eﬀects of cam-
paigns on the political equilibrium. Accordingly, we focus on the political outcome
arising from a reduction of mobility costs. The reduction of uncertainty can occur in
two ways. First, the ﬂoor uncertainty represented by the constants fb and fc can be
reduced. Second, the direct mobility costs can be diminished if a candidate leaves his
established position. Both eventualities lead to greater mobility for the candidates.
We restrict detailed examination to the second way of improving the clarity of the
candidates’ positions, since it is clear that both ways produce essentially the same
results. Campaigns in favor of candidate b decrease kb and fb, whereas support for
candidate c decreases kc and fc.
We begin by examining how a reduction of kc or fc aﬀects the political equilibrium.
If candidate c can reduce the uncertainty surrounding his position, kc or fc will be
lowered in the third stage. Thus, we obtain a new political equilibrium with the same
characteristics as in equations (7), (8), and (9), but now featuring new parameters.





kb(ˆ xc − ˆ xb) − fc + fb −
1
4(kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 (12)























Thus, if candidate c can reduce mobility costs, we will have a new equilibrium in which
c will be closer to the median because his increased mobility allows him to gain more
voters by approaching the median voter position. In general, candidate b will be forced
to take a more extreme position.
Similarly, we will obtain symmetrical results if candidate b is able to inform the elec-
torate more eﬃciently. Now we need to investigate the political equilibrium in the case
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4(kb + kc)2
(kb + kc)2 (16)























Hence, if candidate b can improve communication, his position will be drawn toward
the center, and he will win more votes. Thus every candidate has a strong incentive to
reduce the uncertainty of his platform as perceived by the voters.6
5 Donor and Political Equilibrium
5.1 The donor game
We now turn our attention to the incentives faced by political donor groups in the
ﬁrst stage of the electoral game. We assume that the ideal point of each donor group
can be characterized by the preferred point of a typical group member equated with
the donor. We use xj (j = 1, ..., N) to denote the corresponding ideal points. The
6This incentive contrasts with some versions of dynamic political competition in which there may
be a preference for ambiguity (Glazer 1990).
11level of support provided by a donor is determined by the contributions of the number
of politically active members and is represented as bj. We use bjb (bjc) to denote the
support that candidate b (c) receives from group j. A donor will spend money on the
candidate who is more likely to improve the donor’s wealth than the other competitor.
Thus we obtain two campaign functions that depend solely on the aggregate support










The ﬁrst derivatives k′
c and k′
b are negative because more campaign support enables
the candidates to reduce more uncertainty.
We follow a standard assumption that contributors or interest groups are better in-
formed than voters. For simplicity, we assume that donors are fully informed about
the policies candidates will pursue in oﬃce. Hence, contributors observe xa and xb.
Accordingly, if and only if the contribution of candidate b leads to a political outcome
that is closer to the preferred point than the one arising from support for candidate c,
the donor group will support b.
5.2 The value of campaign contributions
Let us now deﬁne the Boolean function F(kc,kb) indicating the political outcome:
F(kc,kb) : R × R −→ {0,1,2} (20)
Value 2 (0) indicates that candidate b (c) will win the election, given the parameters
kb and kc representing the mobility of the candidates. F(kc,kb) = 1 is determined
by the condition xind(kb,kc) = 0 in the last section, which characterizes the pairs
(kb,kc) for which each candidate gets half of the votes.7 Because of the characteristics
of xind(kb,kc) derived in the last section, F(kc,kb) is weakly monotonically increasing
(decreasing) with kc (kb).
We consider four cases. First we assume that candidate b wins the election with or
without the contribution of a donor j, given the contributions of the other donor,
i.e. F(kc,kb) = 2 remains unchanged by the individual donor’s decision. The value of
7In this case, the political outcome may depend on personal characteristics of the candidates.
12campaigns for an individual donor j is denoted by Ij(b)8 and calculated as the diﬀerence



















b − xb) (21)
= (x
′
b − xb)(−xb − x
′
b + 2xj)
If donor j supports candidate b (c), x′
b (xb) will be the political outcome. From the
last section we know that x′
b > xb. Thus Ij(b) is monotonically increasing with xj, and
Ij(b) becomes zero for xj =
x′
b+xb




2 will support candidate b.
The situation is completely analogous if given the contributions of the other donors,
candidate c wins the election with (position x′
c) and without (position xc), i.e. the


















c − xc) (22)





From equation (14) we know that x′
c will be smaller than xc. All donors with most-
preferred points less than
x′
c+xc
2 will select candidate c over b for campaign support.
The third and fourth cases concern scenarios where a single donor can aﬀect the political
outcome. These cases will be discussed later.
5.3 Existence of equilibria
Now we are able to deduce the subgame-perfect equilibria. We deﬁne two critical
candidate positions that do characterize the donor and the political equilibrium. We
claim that the following strategies constitute a political and a donor equilibrium:
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monotonically increasing in x∗
b while k∗
c (x∗
b) is monotonically decreasing in x∗
b.











We ﬁrst observe that x∗
b and x∗
c are uniquely determined. The left side of (23) is clearly
strictly increasing with x∗
b. The right side is monotonically decreasing with x∗
b, since
we know that the lower kc is (or the higher kb), the lower any equilibrium position
of candidate b will be, which is represented by the right side of formula (23). The
arguments are similar for x∗
c.
We thus obtain two diﬀerent cases for the intersection of the left-hand side of equation







In the second case, x∗
b does not coincide with any ideal point of a donor. Thus, by
our deﬁnition of x∗
b and k∗
c, every donor supports one candidate only. In the ﬁrst case,
14x∗
b is exactly the ideal point of a donor whose contributions are not yet included in
the campaign functions kb and kc. As this donor is totally satisﬁed with the political
equilibrium, we assume that he will refraim from providing any support.9
x∗
b and x∗
c characterize a situation in which candidate b receives campaign contributions
from all donors with an ideal point greater than x∗
b, whereas candidate c will only be
supported by the rest of the donors.
We now introduce two assumptions10 that ensure existence:
Assumption 1
Given the political equilibrium strategies and the donor decisions involved in x∗
b and
x∗
c, candidate b will win the election, i.e. F(k∗
c,k∗
b) = 2.
Note that, under Assumption 1, candidate b will receive campaign contributions from




c, no donor can ensure unilaterally that the winning candidate will
change.
Both assumptions can be expressed by exogenous parameters of the model if we assume
a speciﬁc distribution for ideal points of voters. We obtain
Proposition 1
Suppose that Assumptions 1 and 2 hold. Then x∗
b and x∗
c constitute a donor and a
political equilibrium. Candidate b wins the election, and the political outcome is x∗
b
Proof of Proposition 1:
For x∗
b and x∗
c to be an equilibrium, we have to show that no donor has an incentive
to deviate. By changing his support, a donor with xj < x∗
b would make the political
outcome (still xb) greater than x∗
b and hence further away from his own preferred point.
For the same reason, a donor with xj > x∗
b will not want to switch his support from b
to c. Therefore, given the contributions of the other donors, each donor will be worse
oﬀ if he deviates. Since x∗
b and x∗
c are also political equilibrium, x∗
b and x∗
c constitute
9If he still wants to spend some money, he will have to split his contributions among the candidates
in order to ensure that the political equilibrium is not disrupted by his contribution.
10The assumptions are discussed and weakened in the next section.
15a donor and a political subgame-perfect equilibria. The political outcome is x∗
b.
The intuition for the equilibrium behavior of donors runs as follows: Suppose donors
expect the leftist candidate b to win the election. Then donors to the left of the
winning leftist candidate will give money to the rightist candidate, as this pushes the
equilibrium platform of the leftist candidate towards the left. Donors located to the
right of the winning platform will support the winner, as this pushes his platform to
the right.




fc − fb + k∗∗
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1 ˆ xb + k∗∗
























b exist and are unique. We now introduce the complementary Assump-
tions 1′ and 2′. Assumption 1′ requires that F(k∗∗
c ,k∗∗
b ) = 0 and Assumption 2′ requires
that no donor can aﬀect the political outcome individually, given the contributions of
the other donors. We obtain
Proposition 2
Suppose Assumptions 1′ and 2′ hold. Then x∗∗
b and x∗∗
c constitute a political and
donor subgame-perfect equilibrium. Candidate c wins the election, and the political
outcome is x∗∗
c .
The proof of Proposition 2 follows the same lines as Proposition 1. The characteristics
of the equilibria are summarized in the following ﬁgure, which represents the donors’
ideal points, the median voter, and the political equilibrium, as well as the donors’








support c support b
Before we consider further features of these equilibria, we shall ﬁrst discuss the as-
sumptions and the uniqueness issue.
5.4 Discussion of the assumptions and uniqueness
It is easy to demonstrate that, under the assumptions of the last section, the derived
equilibria are unique. Let us consider, for instance, a potential donor and a political
equilibrium, say xb and xc, in which candidate b wins the election. If any donor with an
ideal point less than xb supports candidate b, he can increase his utility by supporting
c, which drives the political outcome toward his ideal point. Similarly, a donor with
xj > xb can do no better than to support candidate b in order to reduce the distance
between the political outcome and his preferred point. Thus under the two assumptions
the derived equilibria are unique.
Next we discuss what happens if one assumption does not hold.
First, we have assumed that the position x∗
b (x∗∗
c ) will gain a majority of voters. If
this condition is not fulﬁlled, we will have only one equilibrium. The reason is that as
candidate b (c) receives more donor support in the case of x∗
b (x∗∗





c. So if, for instance, candidate b gains no majority with x∗
b,
candidate c is sure of winning the election in the situation x∗∗
b , x∗∗
c . Therefore we have
at least one equilibrium.





c , no donor can change the political outcome by changing his decision.
If, in an equilibrium characterized by x∗
b and x∗
c, a donor with xj > x∗
c can ensure
that candidate c will win the election with his donations, he will, of course, select
17candidate c over b. So, in this case x∗
b, x∗
c cannot be an equilibrium. Thus, in general,
if a donor is pivotal in a potential equilibrium, the political equilibrium will not be a
donor equilibrium. But again, if for instance, in x∗
b, x∗
c the majority of voters in favor of
candidate b is very small, which will enable one donor to change the political outcome,
the equilibria x∗∗
b , x∗∗
c , will in general imply a substantial majority for candidate c.
So, as a rule we expect in this case again one equilibrium to hold if we have enough
donors.11
5.5 Implications
The derived donor and political equilibria have some remarkable consequences. We
now discuss several important features of the case when all assumptions hold and both
equilibria exist.
Both candidates have a chance of winning the election that depends on the realization of
the equilibrium. Members of the donor group will support a candidate whose position is
not closest to their own ideal point. In an equilibrium x∗
b, x∗
c on the other hand, donors
with xj < x∗
b will support candidate c, whereas a donor with xj = x∗
c will contribute to
funding of candidate b’s campaign. In any case, however, donors located around the
median will support the winning candidate. If he coincides with the median voter, the
median donor will always contribute to the candidate whose position is closest to his.
Campaign support increasing the mobility of both candidates leads to a convergence





and kc and kb decrease due to advertising.12
This convergence does not end at the median or in equal locations, but the positions
with campaigns are closer than those without campaigns.
Moreover, symmetrical political and support constellations yield asymmetrical out-
comes. Suppose prospective campaign funds are symmetrically distributed around the
median position and ˆ xc = −ˆ xb, fc = fb, and kc = kb without advertising. Then, in a
donor and a political equilibrium, the candidates do not take up symmetrical positions.
11Precise conditions can be given when distributions of voters and donors are speciﬁed.
12This will not be true if the uncertainty ﬂoors b and c are lowered by campaigns, because in this
case the distance between candidate b and c remains unchanged.
18By contrast, in equilibrium one candidate c will win and attract the majority of donors
despite the fact that both candidates are equally attractive at the outset.
A property of the equilibria is that small diﬀerences in candidate positions without
campaigns do not destroy the incentives for donors to contribute, because a reduction
of uncertainty aﬀects the equilibrium platforms. Political controversy is not a neces-
sary condition for fundraising, which gives an important twist to the literature (e.g.
Congleton 1989).
The increase of mobility by campaigns does not necessarily imply that voters perceive
lower uncertainty in equilibrium. Let us consider a constellation in which candidate b
is located in his established point ˆ xb without campaigns and wins the election. In the
donor and political equilibrium in which b wins, voters will perceive higher uncertainty,
since b is drawn toward the center, which is associated with higher uncertainty com-
pared to the outcome without campaigns. Thus campaigns that reduce uncertainty
can heighten uncertainty in a donor and political equilibrium.
It has been argued that consistent incumbents are perceived as a lottery with smaller
variance than any challenger (e.g. Bernhardt and Ingberman (1985) and Anderson and
Glomm (1992)). This fact can be easily incorporated into our framework. Suppose
candidate c is the incumbent. We assume that ˆ xc = −ˆ xb, fc < fb, and kc < kb without
any campaign support. Then the incumbent will win the election without campaigns,
since equations (5), (7), and (8) imply that xind
i < 0 = xm. But our model shows that
despite this initial advantage there may be an equilibrium in which the challenger will
win the election if he wins over the major part of the donors. This suggests another
way of looking at incumbent/challenger competition characterized by the diﬃculty
of defeating the incumbent. If and only if the challenger is able to organize donor
support much better than the incumbent, will he be able to defeat the incumbent.
Hence the electoral advantage for the incumbent can be suddenly outweighed by a new
organization of donors by the challenger.
6 Concluding Remarks
We have examined a simple model of campaigns in which contributers support can-
didates who can then engage in costly campaigning. We have argued that campaigns
may induce a run by a number of interest groups to support one candidate.
The results in this paper constitute a set of testable propositions pertaining to the
19relationships among a set of endogenous variables (candidates’ policies, contribution
decisions, amount of contributions, electoral outcomes, etc.) and a set of exogenous
variables (incumbency advantage, distribution of voters and donors). Moreover, the
model presented in this paper can be extended in several directions. The model could
be complemented by other aspects of campaigns. For instance, interest groups may
contribute money because they receive services or get access to politicians when a can-
didate takes oﬃce. This would tend to increase the incentives of interest groups to
support the winning candidate and would reinforce the run phenomenon. Finally, we
have assumed that candidates only care about winning the election. Suppose we as-
sumed instead that candidates have policy preferences. As shown by Gersbach (1998),
this produces a very diﬀerent distribution of campaign expenditures across winners and
losers. Comparing both models with empirical data could be used to test the objective
functions of candidates, i.e. which objective functions of candidates are consistent with
empirical campaign patterns.
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Thus the candidates take diﬀerent positions in equilibrium, depending on the mobility
costs.
We insert xc − xb = 1
2(kc + kb) into the ﬁrst ﬁrst-order condition and obtain
1 −
fc − fb + kc
1
2(kb + kc) + kc
￿
ˆ xc − xb − 1
2(kb + kc)
￿
− kb(xb − ˆ xb)
1





2 = fc − fb − xb(kb + kc) + kcˆ xc + kbˆ xb.
Thus we ﬁnd that
xb =
fc − fb + kbˆ xb + kcˆ xc − 1
4(kb + kc)2
kb + kc
21Because of xc = 1
2(kc + kb) + xb we obtain
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